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The Jessup, Josephthal case

Exhibit "B"

The Division's Brief in Opposition to the Petition for
Writ of Certiorari embraces the same error engaged in by the
Court of Appeals -- not in its amended opinion of February 19,
1992, but in the Court of Appeals' original opinion of November
29, 1991. Specifically, and as if it hadn't read the amended
opinion, the Division continues to argue that its Summary Order
of March 1, 1989, was a "Stop Trading Order."
brief at pp. 3-4.

See e.g., Division

The Court of Appeals scuttled this untenable

proposition in its amended opinion.

The Division simply doesn't

understand what the amended opinion says and what the Division
itself, as a state regulatory agency, has the power to do.
While the Division continues to embrace the admittedly
erroneous original opinion of the Court of Appeals, the Court of
Appeals' amended opinion acknowledges that a summary order
entered under Utah Code Ann. §61-1-14(3) does not operate to
"suspend trading."1

Further, while the amended opinion does

indeed recognize that trading cannot be suspended under Utah law,

1

This singular aspect of the amended opinion (something it holds by default by
deleting its prior §12 analysis) is correct because "trading" is an exclusively federal concept
as set forth in the avowed purpose of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, an Act over
which federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction. The Preamble of such Act states:
An Act to provide for the regulation of
securities exchanges and of over-the-counter
markets operating in interstate and foreign
commerce and through the mails, to prevent
inequitable and unfair practices on such
exchanges and markets, and for other
purposes.
See p. 33, Petitioners' Court of Appeals Brief below; see also Section 2 of the Exchange Act,
Necessity for Regulation as Provided in This Title, Vol 2, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1120,111 at
p. 15,051, Rel. #1267 (January 6, 1988).

the Court of Appeals still errs by further holding (in an effort
to achieve the same, original result) that the "intent, scope or
purpose" of the Summary Order is to "suspend trading,"

The

amended opinion is thus even more erroneous than the first
opinion because it allows the Division to accomplish indirectly
what it admittedly could never do directly.

The Division's brief

in opposition only underscores the whole problem:

the Division

has tried to convince the Court of Appeals, from the ALJ on up,
that a §14(3) summary order is a "trading suspension" when it
cannot be as a matter of law.

Thus, even if the Johnsons1

post-market-making purchases were tantamount to "trading" (which
they aren't as a matter of law), it doesn't matter.
The Division next argues that because Judge Greene
concluded that Johnson-Bowles "knew or should have known about
the irregularities" respecting U.S.A. Medical stock, its conduct
in honoring its outstanding federal contracts —
longer a market-maker —
unethical."

after it was no

is necessarily "dishonest or

Three things this Court must recognize: First,

under Rule 15c2-ll(f)(3)(i) and (ii) of the General Rules and
Regulations of the Commission, a full copy of which is attached
hereto as Exhibit "A", a broker may commence market-making
activities in a security with no due dilligence based on other
brokers already being "in the sheets" on (i.e., trading) the same
stock.

In other words, Johnson-Bowles had every right to trade

U.S.A. Medical in late 1988/early 1989 without confirming — on
its own, independently —

the truth and accuracy of

U.S.A. Medical's due dilligence materials.2
"A".

See Exhibit

Thus, for what it's worth, based on Rule 15c2-ll(f)(3)(i)

and (ii)/ Judge Greene was wrong and he didn't need to make such
finding to deny Johnson-Bowles' motion for preliminary injunction
even though he may have thought it was necessary to do so. At
the same time, the exemptions provided in Rule 15c2-ll(f) were
never pointed out to Judge Greene because Johnson-Bowles was not,
or at least didn't think, that it was on trial on February 27 and
28, 1989.
Secondly, it would be sheer madness for a broker to
trade a security knowing the stock is "boxed" by a band of
hoodlums.

Johnson-Bowles obviously had no idea this was the case

or it never would have allowed its traders to become "short" in
the first place.3
Third, no one would expect a stock which was forwardsplit to increase ten-fold.

On the contrary, the stock should

have traded at 100 per share after the forward-split, not the

2

In order to make-a-market in U.S.A. Medical, Johnson-Bowles was entitled to
rely on the exemptions provided in Rule 15c2-11(f)(3) because it was not the first broker to
be "in the sheets" in late 1988/early 1989 and several other broker-dealers had continuously
been "in the sheets." Furthermore, assuming such had not been the case, Johnson-Bowles
complied with Rule 15c2-11(a)(5), also comprising Exhibit "A", because the "source" of U.S.A.
Medical's due dilligence materials, namely, James L. Averett, a local securities attorney who
prepared and endorsed such materials, is a person that Johnson-Bowles had "a reasonable
basis for believing was reliable." See Subsection (a)(5) to Rule 15c2-11. See also p. 9,
footnote 6, the Johnsons' Court of Appeals Brief below, citing to U.S.A. Medical's due
dilligence package in the record, an exhibit to Johnson-Bowies' federal court 10b-5
complaint. Specifically, it is Exhibit "H" to the Johnsons' Hearing Exhibit R-5.
3

This is not to ignore that Johnson-Bowles originally became "short" 15,000
shares, an amount which automatically converted on January 23, 1989 into 150,000 shares,
as a result of a fail-to-deliver by Rick Hermanson, one of the U.S.A. Medical coconspirators.

equivalent of $10 per share.

Again, that this occurred was not

the fault of either Johnson-Bowles or Mr. Johnson and the
opposite effect of a normal forward-split was far beyond their
control.
In sum, having made a market in U.S.A. Medical in late
1988/early 1989 —
—

even in light of Judge Greene's determination

does not make Johnson-Bowles in pari delicto with the

criminals who manipulated its stock.

See e.g., Jessup,

Josephthal & Co v. Piquet & Cie, [1991 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 196,195 at p. 91,029 (S.D.N.Y., August
21, 1991) (negligence, imprudence, stupidity, or even
recklessness are legally insufficient to trigger in pari delicto
or aiding and abetting liability), a copy of which is attached
hereto as Exhibit "B".

See also pp. 59, 71, 72, 75 and 81, the

Johnsons1 Court of Appeals Brief below, citing the U.S. Supreme
Court's 1988 Pinter v. Dahl 4

decision and this Court's decision

in Schanaveldt v. Noy-Burn Milling & Processing Corp., 347 P.2d
553, 554 (Utah 1959).

Thus, if Johnson-Bowles was indeed stupid

or negligent for having made a market in U.S.A. Medical stock in
the first instance, it is a classic non sequitur to conclude that
Johnson-Bowles (and Johnson) acted "dishonestly" or "unethically"
several months later in buying stock to honor contractual
commitments incurred in the ordinary course of such prior
market-making activity, conduct subsequently undertaken in good
faith to protect itself and those to whom it owed stock.

4
486 U.S. 622, 108 S.Ct. 2063, 100 L.Ed.2d 658, [*87-'88 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) f93,790 (June 15, 1988); see also p. 6, the Johnsons' December 13, 1991,
Petition for Rehearing below.

The Johnsons1 Petition is not, by any means, an attempt
to reargue the facts of the case. Division brief, pp. 3-4. On
the contrary, it is only an attempt to get a fair and honest
application of the law to such facts.
The Johnsons' Petition for Writ of Certiorari adequately
addresses all other issues raised by the Division in its brief in
opposition.5
Based on the foregoing, more especially the Johnsons1
March 20, 1992, Petition for Writ of Certiorari, there is
absolutely no legal or other basis for the Court of Appeals'
conclusion that the Johnsons engaged in "dishonest or unethical
[business] practices," let alone that it was in the "public
interest" to put them out of business.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
DATED this 30th day of Aptfllf, fi.992,

n Michael Coor
torney for the Johnsons

5

The Division argues that the Johnsons have failed to meet any criterion for
certiorari set forth in Rule 46, Utah R. App. Pro. Division brief at pp. 6-7. While the
Johnsons contend in their Petition that they meet Rule 46(a), (c) and (d), they also meet Rule
46(b). This is because the Court of Appeals' amended decision is in direct conflict with
Morton Int'l v. Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm., 814 P.2d 581, 585 (Utah 1991).
While Morton talks generally of agencies being "in a better position than the courts to give
effect to the regulatory objective," Morton does not give the Court of Appeals a blanket and
blind license to "rubberstamp" final agency actions — something that unquestionably
occurred in this case.
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(h) If the Commission after appropriate notice and hearing find^fcWfFTIie
sponsor of any plan absent reasonable justification or excuse, has fc^lSrrocomply,
or to enforce compliance by participants or subscribers withU|beHerms conditions,
and undertakings of its effective trading system plg^jflrcl if it appears to the
Commission that such failure is inconsistent wtf^jifife public interest, the protec
tion of investors, and the maintenance of fe^r^md orderly markets or the removal
of impediments to and perfection oijjptf mechanisms of a national market system
for securities and a national systpirfor the clearance and settlement of securities
transactions the Commissjfljgmall rescind the effectiveness of the trading system
plan
(I) EffeoflfFcIaLes The effective date of this section shall be [six months after
date fofcjifloption of rule]

[H 25,116]

Initiation or Resumption of Quotations Without
Specified Information
m->- Rule 15c2-l 1 is amended and proposed to be amended See below

Reg §240 15c2-U. (a) It shall be a fraudulent, manipulative, and deceptive
practice within the meaning of Section 15(c)(2) of the Act, for a broker or dealer to
publish any quotation for a security or, directly or indirectly, to submit any such
quotation for publication, in any quotation medium (as defined in this rule) unless
(1) The issuer has filed a registration statement under the Securities Act of 1933,
other than a registration statement on Form F-6, which became effective less than 90
calendar days prior to the day on which such broker or dealer publishes or submits the
quotation to the quotation medium, Provided That such registration statement has not
thereafter been the subject of a stop order which is still in effect when the quotation is
published or submitted, and such broker or dealer has in his records a copy of the
prospectus specified by Section 10(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, [Amended in
Release No 34-21470 (f 83,705), effective January 14, 1985, 49 F R 45117 ]
(2) the issuer has filed a notification under Regulation A under the Securities Act
of 1933 which became effective less than 40 calendar days prior to the day on which
such broker or dealer publishes or submits the quotation to the quotation medium,
provided that the offering circular provided for under Regulation A has not thereafter
become the subject of a suspension order which is still in effect when the quotation is
published or submitted, and such broker or dealer has in his records a copy of such
offering circular, or
(3) (I) the issuer is required to file reports pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of
the Act, or is the issuer of a security covered by Section 12(g)(2)(B) or (G) of
the Act, and
(n) the broker or dealer has a reasonable basis for believing that the issuer is
current in filing the reports required to be filed at regular intervals pursuant
to Section 13 of 15(d) of the Act, or, in the case of insurance companies
exempted from Section 12(g) of the Act by subparagraph 12(g)(2)(G) thereof,
the annual statement referred to in Section 12(g)(2)(G)(i) of the Act, and
(in) the broker or dealer has in his records the issuer's most recent annual
report filed pursuant to Section 13 of 15(d) of the Act or the annual
statement in the case of an insurance company not subject to Section 12(g) of
the Act together with any other reports required to be filed at regular
intervals under such provisions of the Act which have been filed by the issuer
after such annual report or annual statement, or
Federal Securities Law Reports

Reg. § 240.15c2-ll
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(4)(i) The issuer is exempt from Section 12(g) of the Act by reason of compliance
with the provisions of §240 12g3-2(b), and [Added in Release No 34-21470 (If 83,705),
effective January 14, 1985, 49 F R 45117 ]
(n) The broker or dealer wishing to submit for publication a quotation for such
security has in his records, and makes reasonably available upon request to any person
expressing an interest in a proposed transaction in the security with such broker or
dealer, the information furnished to the Commission pursuant to §240 12g3-2(b) since
the beginning of the issuer's last fiscal year, which the broker or dealer has no
reasonable basis for believing is not true and correct and which was obtained by him
from sources that he has a reasonable basis for believing are reliable, or [Added in
Release No 34-21470flf83,705), effective January 14, 1985, 49 F R 45117 ]
(5) Such broker or dealer has in his records, and shall make reasonably available
upon request to any person expressing an interest in a proposed transaction in the
security with such broker or dealer, the following information (which shall be reasonably current in relation to the day the quotation is submitted), which he has no
reasonable basis for believing is not true and correct or reasonably current, and which
was obtained by him from sources which he has a reasonable basis for believing are
reliable (1) the exact name of the issuer and its predecessor (if any), (2) the address of
its principal executive offices, (3) the state of incorporation, if it is a corporation, (4)
the exact title and class of the security, (5) the par or stated value of the security, (6)
the number of shares or total amount of the securities outstanding as of the end of the
issuer's most recent fiscal year, (7) the name and address of the transfer agent, (8) the
nature of the issuer's business, (9) the nature of products or services offered, (10) the
nature and extent of the issuer's facilities, (11) the name of the chief executive officer
and members of the board of directors, (12) the issuer's most recent balance sheet and
profit and loss and retained earnings statements, (13) similar financial information for
such part of the two preceding fiscal years as the issuer or its predecessor has been in
existence, (14) whether the broker or dealer or any associated person is affiliated,
directly or indirectly with the issuer, (15) whether the quotation is being published or
submitted on behalf of any other broker or dealer, and, if so, the name of such broker or
dealer, and, (16) whether the quotation is being submitted or published directly or
indirectly on behalf of the issuer, or any director, officer or any person, directly or
indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 10 per cent of the outstanding units or
shares of any equity security of the issuer, and, if so, the name of such person, and the
basis for any exemption under the federal securities laws for any sales of such securities
on behalf of such person If such information is made available to others upon request
pursuant to this subparagraph, such delivery, unless otherwise represented, shall not
constitute a representation by such broker or dealer that such information is true and
correct, but shall constitute a representation by such broker or dealer that the
information is reasonably current in relation to the day the quotation is submitted,
that he has no reasonable basis for believing the information is not true and correct,
and that the information was obtained from sources which he has a reasonable basis for
believing are reliable This paragraph (a)(5) shall not apply to any security of an issuer
included in paragraph (a)(3) of this section unless a report or statement of such issuer
described in paragraph (a)(3) of this section is not reasonably available to the broker or
dealer A report or statement of an issuer described in paragraph (a)(3) of this section
shall be "reasonably available" when such report or statement is filed with the
Commission [Amended in Release No 34-21470 (fl 83,705), effective January 14, 1985,
49 FR 45117]
(b) With respect to any security the quotation of which is within the provisions of
this rule, the broker or dealer submitting or publishing such quotation shall maintain in
his records information regarding all circumstances involved in the submission of
publication of such quotation, including the identitv of the person or persons for whom
U 25,116

Reg- § 240.15c2-ll
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the quotation is being submitted or published and any information regarding the
transaction provided to the broker or dealer by such person or persons.
(c) The broker or dealer shall maintain in writing as part of his records the
information described in paragraphs (a) and (b), and any other information (including
adverse information) regarding the issuer which comes to his knowledge or possession
before the publication or submission of the quotation, and preserve such records for the
periods specified in Rule 17a-4
(d) For any security of an issuer included in paragraph (a)(5), the broker or dealer
submitting the quotation shall furnish to the inter-dealer-quotation-system (as defined
below), in such form as such system shall prescribe, at least 2 days before the quotation
is published or submitted, the information regarding the security and the issuer which
such broker or dealer is required to maintain pursuant to said paragraph (aX4).
[Amended in Release No. 34-21470 (If 83,705), effective January 14, 1985, 49 F.R.
45117.]
Wh+ Reproduced below is the text of Rule 15c2~ll, paragraph (a)-(d) as amended,
effective June 1,1991.

Preliminary Note: Brokers and dealers may wish to refer to Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 29094 (April 17, 1991), for a discussion of procedures for gathering
and reviewing the information required by this rule and the requirement that a broker
or dealer have a reasonable basis for believing that the information is accurate and
obtained from reliable sources.
Reg. §240.15c2-ll. (a) As a means reasonably designed to prevent fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, it shall be unlawful for a broker or dealer
to publish any quotation for a security or, directly or indirectly, to submit any such
quotation for publication, in any quotation medium (as defined in this section) unless
such broker or dealer has in its records the documents and information required by this
paragraph (for purposes of this section, "paragraph (a) information"), and, based upon
a review of the paragraph (a) information together with any other documents and
information required by paragraph (b) of this section, has a reasonable basis under the
circumstances for believing that the paragraph (a) information is accurate in all
material respects, and that the sources of the paragraph (a) information are reliable.
The information required pursuant to this paragraph is:
(1) A copy of the prospectus specified by section 10(a) of the Securities Act of 1933
for an issuer that has filed a registration statement under the Securities Act of 1933,
other than a registration statement on Form F-6, which became effective less than 90
calendar days prior to the day on which such broker or dealer publishes or submits the
quotation to the quotation medium, Provided That such registration statement has not
thereafter been the subject of a stop order which is still in effect when the quotation is
published or submitted; or
(2) A copy of the offering circular provided for under Regulation A under the
Securities Act of 1933 for an issuer that has filed a notification under Regulation A
which became effective less than 40 calendar days prior to the day on which such
broker or dealer publishes or submits the quotation to the quotation medium, Provided
That the offering circular provided for under Regulation A has not thereafter become
the subject of a suspension order which is still in effect when the quotation is published
or submitted, or
(3) A copy of the issuer's most recent annual report filed pursuant to Section 13 or
15(d) of the Act or a copy of the annual statement referred to in Section 12(g)(2)(G)(i)
of the Act, in the case of an issuer required to file reports pursuant to Section 13 or
15(d) of the Act or an issuer of a security covered by section 12(gX2XB) or (G) of the
Act, together with any quarterly and current reports that have been filed under the
provisions of the Act by the issuer after such annual report or annual statement;
Provided, however, That until such issuer has filed its first annual report pursuant to
Federal Securities Law Reports

Reg. § 240.15c2-ll
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Section 13 or 15(d) of the Act or annual statement referred to in Section 12(g)(2)(G)(i)
of the Act, the broker or dealer has in its records a copy of the prospectus specified by
Section 10(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 included in a registration statement filed by
the issuer under the Securities Act of 1933, other than a registration statement on
Form F-6, that became effective within the prior 16 months or a copy of any
registration statement filed by the issuer under Section 12 of the Act that became
effective within the prior 16 months, together with any quarterly and current reports
filed thereafter under section 13 or 15(d) of the Act; and Provided Further That the
broker or dealer has a reasonable basis under the circumstances for believing that the
issuer is current in filing annual, quarterly, and current reports filed pursuant to
section 13 or 15(d) of the Act, or, in the case of an insurance company exempted from
section 12(g) of the Act by reason of section 12(g)(2)(G) thereof, the annual statement
referred in section 12(g)(2)(G)(i) of the Act; or
(4) The information furnished to the Commission pursuant to §240.12g3-2(b)
since the beginning of the issuer's last fiscal year, in the case of an issuer exempt from
Section 12(g) of the Act by reason of compliance with the provisions of §240.12g3-2(b),
which information the broker or dealer shall make reasonably available upon request to
any person expressing an interest in a proposed transaction in the security with such
broker or dealer; or
(5) The following information, which shall be reasonably current in relation to the
day the quotation is submitted and which the broker or dealer shall make reasonably
available upon request to any person expressing an interest in a proposed transaction
in the security with such broker or dealer:
(i) the exact name of the issuer and its predecessor (if any);
(ii) the address of its principal executive offices;
(iii) the state of incorporation, if it is a corporation;
(iv) the exact title and class of the security;
(v) the par or stated value of the security;
(vi) the number of shares or total amount of the securities outstanding as of the
end of the issuer's most recent fiscal year;
(vii) the name and address of the transfer agent;
(viii) the nature of the issuer's business;
(ix) the nature of products or services offered;
(x) the nature and extent of the issuer's facilities;
(xi) the name of the chief executive officer and members of the board of directors;
(xii) the issuer's most recent balance sheet and profit and loss and retained
earnings statements;
(xiii) similar financial information for such part of the two preceding fiscal years
as the issuer or its predecessor has been in existence;
(xiv) whether the broker or dealer or any associated person is affiliated, directly or
indirectly with the issuer;
(xv) whether the quotation is being published or submitted on behalf of any other
broker or dealer, and, if so, the name of such broker or dealer, and,
(xvi) whether the quotation is being submitted or published directly or indirectly
on behalf of the issuer, or any director, officer or any person, directly or indirectly the
beneficial owner of more than 10 per cent of the outstanding units or shares of any
equity security of the issuer, and, if so, the name of such person, and the basis for any
11 25,116

Reg. § 240.15c2-ll
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exemption under the federal securities laws for any sales of such securities on behalf of
such person.
If such information is made available to others upon request pursuant to this
paragraph, such delivery, unless otherwise represented, shall not constitute a
representation by such broker or dealer that such information is accurate, but shall
constitute a representation by such broker or dealer that the information is reasonably
current in relation to the day the quotation is submitted, that the broker or dealer has
a reasonable basis under the circumstances for believing the information is accurate in
all material respects, and that the information was obtained from sources which the
broker or dealer has a reasonable basis for believing are reliable. This paragraph (a)(5)
shall not apply to any security of an issuer included in paragraph (a)(3) of this section
unless a report or statement of such issuer described in paragraph (a)(3) of this section
is not reasonably available to the broker or dealer. A report or statement of an issuer
described in paragraph (a)(3) of this section shall be "reasonably available" when such
report or statement is filed with the Commission. [Amended in Release No.-34-21470
(1183,705), effective January 14, 1985, 49 F.R. 45117; and Release No. 34-29094
(f 84,725), effective June 1, 1991, 56 F.R. 19148.]
(b) With respect to any security the quotation of which is within the provisions of
this section, the broker or dealer submitting or publishing such quotation shall have in
its records the following documents and information:
(1) A record of the circumstances involved in the submission of publication of such
quotation, including the identity of the person or persons for whom the quotation is
being submitted or published and any information regarding the transactions provided
to the broker or dealer by such person or persons;
(2) A copy of any trading suspension order issued by the Commission pursuant to
Section 12(k) of the Act respecting any securities of the issuer or its predecessor (if any)
during the 12 months preceding the date of the publication or submission of the
quotation, or a copy of the public release issued by the Commission announcing such
trading suspension order; and
(3) A copy or a written record of any other material information (including
adverse information) regarding the issuer which comes to the broker's or dealer's
knowledge or possession before the publication or submission of the quotation.
[Amended in Release No. 34-29094 (ff 84,725), effective June 1, 1991, 56 F.R. 19148.]
(c) The broker or dealer shall preserve the documents and information required
under paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section for a period of not less than three years, the
first two vears in an easily accessible place. [Amended in Release No. 34-29094
(1f84,725), effective June 1, 1991, 56 F.R. 19148.]
Proposed Amendment
»»-> Reproduced below is the text of paragraph (cX2) as proposed to be added in
Release No. 34-29095 (f 84,726), April 17, 1991. Existing paragraph (c) would be
redesignated as (cXO-

(2) The broker or dealer need not have in its records the information described in
this paragraph (a), or make information available to other persons in accordance with
paragraph (a)(4) or (a)(5) of this section, to the extent that such information is
reasonably available to the broker or dealer and such other persons from an entity
designated by the Commission by rule, regulation, or order as a securities information
repository. In determining whether to grant, deny, suspend, condition, or withdraw
such a designation, the Commission will consider whether the repository
(0 collects information about a substantial segment of issuers of securities subject
to this rule,
(n) maintains current and accurate information about such issuers;
Federal Securities Law Reports
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Proposed Amendment
(iii) has effective acquisition, retrieval, and dissemination systems;
(iv) places no inappropriate limits on the issuers from or about which it will accept
information;
(v) provides access to the documents deposited with it to anyone willing and able
to pay the applicable fees;
(vi) charges reasonable fees; and
(vii) in general, is so organized and has the capacity to be able reasonably to carry
out the purposes of this section.
End ol Proposed Amendment
m+ Paragraph (d) is proposed to be removed in Release No. 34-29095 (f 84,726),
April 17,1991. Existing paragraphs (e)-(h) would be redesigna ted as (djh(g).

(d)(1) For any security of an issuer included in paragraph (a)(5) of this section,
the broker or dealer submitting the quotation shall furnish to the interdealer quotation
system (as defined in paragraph (e)(2) of this section), in such form as such system
shall prescribe, at least 3 business days before the quotation is published or submitted,
the information regarding the security and the issuer which such broker or dealer is
required to maintain pursuant to said paragraph (a)(5) of this section.
(2) For any security of an issuer included in paragraph (a)(3) of this section, (i) a
broker-dealer shall be in compliance with the requirement to obtain current reports
filed by the issuer if the broker-dealer obtains all current reports filed with the
Commission by the issuer as of a date up to five business days in advance of the earlier
of the date of submission of the quotation to the quotation medium and the date of
submission of paragraph (a) information pursuant to Schedule H of the By-Laws of the
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.; and (ii) a broker-dealer shall be in
compliance with the requirements to obtain the annual, quarterly, and current reports
filed by the issuer, if the broker-dealer has made arrangements to receive all such
reports when filed by the issuer and it has regularly received reports from the issuer on
a timely basis, unless the broker-dealer has a reasonable basis under the circumstances
for behaving that the issuer has failed to file a required report or has filed a report but
has not sent it to the broker-dealer. [Amended in Release No. 34-21470 (1(83,705),
effective January 14, 1985, 49 F.R. 45-117; and Release No. 34-29094 (f 84,725),
effective June 1,1991, 56 F.R. 19148.]
(e) For purposes of this rule:
(1) "Quotation medium" shall mean any "inter-dealer quotation system" or
any publication or electronic communications network or other device which is
ustfd by brokers or dealers to make known to others their interest in transactions in
any security, including offers to buy or sell at a stated price or otherwise, or
invitations of offers to buy or selL
(2) "inter-dealer quotation system" shall mean any system of general circulation to brokers or dealers which regularly disseminates quotations of identified
brokers or dealers.
(3) Except as otherwise specified in this rule, "quotation" shall mean any bid
or offer at a specified price with respect to a security, or any indication of interest
by a broker or dealer in receiving bids or offers from others for a security, or any
indication by a broker or dealer that he wishes to advertise his general interest in
buying or selling a particular security. [Amended in Release No. 34-21470
(fl 83,705), effective January 14, 1985, 49 F.R. 45117.]
(4) "Issuer," in the case of quotations represented by American Depositary
Receipts, shall mean the issuer of the deposited shares represented by such
H 25,116
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American Depositary Receipts. [Added in Release No 34-21470 (If 83,705)
effective January 14, 1985, 49 F.R. 45117.]
(f) The provisions of this rule shall not apply to(1) The publication or submission of a quotation respecting a security admitted to
trading on a national securities exchange and which is traded on such an exchange on
the same day as, or on the business day next preceding, the day the quotation is
published or submitted
(2) The publication or submission by a broker or dealer, solely on behalf of a
customer (other than a person acting as or for a dealer), of a quotation that represents
the customer's indication of interest and does not involve the solicitation of the
customer's interest, Provided, however, That this paragraph (f)(2) shall not apply to a
quotation consisting of both a bid and an offer, each of which is at a specified price,
unless the quotation medium specifically identifies the quotation as representing such
an unsolicited customer interest. [Amended in Release No. 34-21470 (f 83,705), effective January 14, 1985, 49 F R. 45117.]
(3)(i) The publication or submission, in an interdealer quotation system that
specifically identifies as such unsolicited customer indications of interest of the kind
described in paragraph (f)(2) of this section, of a quotation respecting a security which
has been the subject of quotations (exclusive of any identified customer interests) in
such a system on each of at least 12 days within the previous 30 calendar days, with no
more than 4 business days in succession without a quotation; or [Amended in Release
No. 34-21470fl[83,705), effective January 14, 1985, 49 F.R. 45117.]
(ii) The publication or submission, in an interdealer quotation system that does
not so identify any such unsolicited customer indications of interest, of a quotation
respecting a security which has been the subject of both bid and ask quotations in an
interdealer quotation system at specified prices on each of at least 12 days within the
previous 30 calendar days, with no more than 4 business days in succession without
such a two-way quotation; [Amended in Release No. 34-21470 (jf 83,705), effective
January 14, 1985, 49 F.R. 45117.]
(iii) A dealer acting in the capacity of market maker, as defined in section 3(a)(38)
of the Act, that has published or submitted a quotation respecting a security in an
interdealer quotation system and such quotation has qualified for an exception provided in this paragraph (f)(3), may continue to publish or submit quotations for such
security in the interdealer quotation system without compliance with this section
unless and until such dealer ceases to submit or publish a quotation or ceases to act in
the capacity of market maker respecting such security. [Amended in Release No.
34-21470 (|[ 83,705), effective January 14, 1985, 49 F.R. 45117.]
Proposed Amendment

—

m-+ Reproduced below is the text of paragraphs (e)(2) and (eX3) as proposed to be
redesignated from (f)(2) and (3) and amended in Release No. 34-29095 (f 84,726), April
17,1991.

(2) The publication or submission by a broker or dealer, solely on behalf of a
customer (other than a person acting as or for a dealer), of a quotation that represents
the customer's indication of interest and does not involve the solicitation of the
customer's interest; Provided, however, That no broker or dealer shall publish or submit
for publication in an interdealer quotation system a quotation representing such an
unsolicited customer interest unless the system specifically so identifies the quotation.
(3) The publication or submission by a broker or dealer, in an interdealer
quotation system, of a quotation respecting a security which has been the subject of
quotations by that broker or dealer in such a system on each of at least 12 days within
the previous 30 calendar days and no more than 4 successive business days have
elapsed during such 30-day period between published quotations of such broker or
Federal Securities Law Reports
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Proposed Amendment
dealer for the security: Provided, That such broker or dealer has, at least once during
the 12-month period prior to the publication or submission of the quotation, complied
with the provisions of paragraph (a) of this section concerning the requirement to have
and review specified records relating to the security.
End of Proposed Amendment
(4) The publication or submission of a quotation respecting a municipal security.
[As added by Release No. 34-12468tf[80,544), May 20, 1976, effective July 5, 1976, 41
F.R. 22826.]
(5) The publication or submission of a quotation respecting a security that is
authorized for quotation in an interdealer quotation system sponsored and governed by
the rules of a registered securities association, and such authorization is not suspended,
terminated or prohibited. [Added in Release No. 34-21470 (tf 83,705), effective January
14, 1985, 49 F.R. 45117.]
»»-•• Reproduced below is the text of paragraph (0(5) as amended effective June 1,
1991.

(5) The publication or submission of a quotation respecting a security that is
authorized for quotation in the NASDAQ system (as defined in § 240.1 lAcl-2(a)(3) of
this chapter), and such authorization is not suspended, terminated, or prohibited.
[Added in Release No. 34-21470 (fl 83,705); effective January 14, 1985; amended in
Release No. 34-29094fl[84,725), effective June 1, 1991, 56 F.R. 19148.]
[Adopted in Release No. 34-12630 (fl 80,646), July 15, 1976, 41 F.R. 30009;
amended in Release No. 34-13310 (H 80,987), February 28, 1977, 42 F.R. 50646;
amended in Release No. 34-13544fl[81,174), May 16, 1977, 42 F.R. 27881; amended
in Release No. 34-13807 (If 81,268), July 28, 1977, 42 F.R. 27881; amended in Release
No. 34-21470flf83,705), effective January 14, 1985, 49 F.R. 45117.]
' (g) The requirement in subparagraph (a)(5) that the information with respect to
the issuer be "reasonably current" will be presumed to be satisfied, unless the broker or
dealer has information to the contrary, if: [Amended in Release No. 34-21470
(H 83,705), effective January 14, 1985, 49 F.R. 45117.]
(1) the balance sheet is as of a date less than 16 months before the publication
or submission of the quotation, the statements of profit and loss and retained
earnings are for the 12 months preceding the date of such balance sheet, and if
such balance sheet is not as of a date less than 6 months before the publication or
submission of the quotation, it shall be accompanied by additional statements of
profit and loss and retained earnings for the period from the date of such balance
sheet to a date less than 6 months before the publication or submission of the
quotation.
(2) other information regarding the issuer specified in subparagraph (a)(4) is
as of a date within 12 months prior to the publication or submission of the
quotation. [Amended in Release No. 34-21470 (f 83,705), effective January 14,
1985, 49 F.R. 45117.]
(h) This rule shall not prohibit any publication or submission of any quotation if
the Commission, upon written request or upon its own motion, exempts such quotation
either unconditionally or on specific terms and conditions, as not constituting a
fraudulent, manipulative or deceptive practice comprehended within the purpose of
this rule.
[Adopted in Release No. 34-9310 (see CCH Special Report No. 387, Extra Edition,
September 1, 1971), effective December 13, 1971, 36 F.R. 18,641; Release No.
34-12468 (1180,544), May 20, 1976, effective July 5, 1976, 41 F.R. 22826. Temporary
rule (f)(4)(T) adopted in Release No. 34-12630 (1f 80,646) and extended to February 28,
H 25,116
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[11 96,195] Jesup, Josephthal & Co., Inc., et al. v. Piguet & Cie., et al.
United States District Court, Southern District of New York. 90 Civ. 6544 (WK). August 21,
1991. Opinion in full text.
1. Exchange Act—Jurisdiction—Minimum Contacts.—A foreign bank charged with securities fraud was subject to jurisdiction in the district in which it maintained brokerage bank accounts.
Although the bank had no offices in the United States, and was not authorized to conduct business
here, by opening trading accounts it availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the
forum state and invoked the benefits and protections of its laws.
See H 26,540. "Exchange Act—Insiders; Recordkeeping; Clearance & Transfer" division, Volume 4.
2. Exchange Act—Antifraud—Aiding and Abetting.—Allegations that a foreign bank
assisted a trader's price manipulation scheme by representing to a brokerage firm that it would pay
for the trader's purchase orders when it knew that he did not have the funds to cover the purchases
were sufficient to state an aiding and abetting claim. Limited discovery would be permitted as to
whether the representations were known by the bank to be false at the time they were made, and
whether the bank's knowledge of the trader's fraudulent scheme could be inferred from its own
trading activities in the stock in question.
See 1122,721 and 22,725, "Exchange Act—Manipulations; National Market System" division,
Volume 3.
3. E x c h a n g e Act—Antifraud—Aiding and Abetting—In Pari Delicto Defense.—A brokerage firm was not precluded from recovering on an aiding and abetting claim against a bank by its
own claimed imprudence and negligence which allegedly caused its financial losses. The in pari
dclicco defense may be invoked only if the plaintiff has been an active, voluntary participant in the
unlawful activity that is the subject of the suit. Mere stupidity or recklessness will not trigger this
bar.
See U 22,721 and 22,725, "Exchange Act—Manipulations; National Market System" division,
Volume 3.
Opinion of KNAPP, District Judge.
By this complaint plaintiffs Jesup, Josephthal
& Co., Inc. and Securities Settlement Corporation (hereinafter "plaintiff"), registered securities broker-dealers in the state of New York,
allege, inter alia, that the defendants violated
provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. §78aa. On Janaury 16, 1991,
plaintiff filed an amended complaint. Pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(bX2) defendant Piguet &
Cie, Banquiers (hereinafter, "Piguet") now
moves to dismiss that complaint on the ground
that this court lacks personal jurisdiction over
it. In the alternative, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)
it moves to dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. For the reasons that follow, the motions are denied.

principal place of business in Switzerland. Plaintiff seeks to recover as against Piguet for its
alleged involvement in a fraud perpetrated by
defendant Paul Kutik (hereinafter "Kutik"),
whom the complaint names as the primary
wrongdoer. As discussed in greater detail infra,
Piguet's alleged participation in this fraud
arises from activities it performed in connection
with a brokerage bank account it maintains at
Morgan Guaranty Trust (hereinafter "Morgan
Guaranty") in New York City.

Piguet is a private bank organized as a partnership under the laws of Switzerland with its

In support of its contention that we lack
personal jurisdiction over it, Piguet informs us
that it does not maintain offices in the United
States and is not authorized to conduct business
here. Its sole contacts with the United States are
three brokerage bank accounts in New York: the
above described Morgan Guaranty account, and
one account each with the Philadelphia International Bank and the American Express Bank
Limited. Piguet asserts that these accounts exist
solely to facilitate international banking transactions, including stock purchase transactions,
and that it maintains these accounts primarily
as a service to its customers. Def. Mem. p.24.1
Although it does not dispute plaintiff's allegation that some of the transactions in these

1
In opposition to the instant motion, plaintiff draws our
attention to yet another account that Piguet has with a
New York brokerage house, namely the "Cowen & Co.
account" which is nowhere mentioned in the complaint.
Plaintiff asserts that Piguet has engaged in substantial

trading in this account. Piguet contests plaintiff's description of this account as a New York account asserting that
this account was serviced by Cowen's office in Geneva,
Switzerland. See Def. Reply Mem. p. 13. Since we find that
on the facts pleaded in the complaint that we have personal

Rule 12(b)(2)
Because a determination that we do not have
jurisdiction over Piguet would leave us without
power to adjudicate any other matter relating to
it, we first address this question.
BACKGROUND
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accounts are performed for the bank's own
investment purposes, it contends that since the
only alleged connection which these accounts
have with the instant suit stems from activities
it performed on behalf of its client, Kutik, "it
would be unreasonable and unfair to subject [it]
to the jurisdiction of this Court." Id. We disagree.
DISCUSSION
It is well settled that personal jurisdiction
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
extends "to the full reach permitted by the due
process clause." Perez-Rubio
v.
Wvckoff
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) 718 F.Supp. 217, 227. Accordingly jurisdiction can be obtained over any
defendant who has "certain minimum contacts
with [the forum] such that the maintenance of
this suit does not offend 'traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.' " Id. at
227-228 (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945) 326 U.S. 310, 316). The inquiry is
necessarily fact specific. Where, as here, jurisdiction is to be asserted over a defendant who is
not present in the forum state but has caused an
effect in the state by an act done elsewhere, due
process requires that the court determine that
the defendant's conduct was such that he
"should reasonably anticipate being haled into
court [in the forum state]" before the exercise of
jurisdiction is proper. See Perez-Rubio, 718
F.Supp. at 228 (citation omitted).
Despite Piguet's recitation of the dearth of
contacts it has with this forum, it is undisputed
that it purchases and sells stock for its clients on
a continuing basis through the above described
correspondent bank accounts. It is also undisputed that the cause of action here asserted
against it arises out of its alleged activities in
one of these accounts, namely the account at
Morgan Guaranty. Although Piguet strenuously
argues that its activities with respect to the
Morgan account here complained of were performed on behalf of its client, and not itself, we
find this fact to be of little relevance for by
offering the services provided by these accounts
to its clients, Piguet acts to inure to its own
benefit. See Securities Exchange Commission v.
Gilbert (1979) 82 F.R.D. 723, 725. By opening
these accounts Piguet purposely chose to
"[avail] itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum State, thus invoking
the benefits and protections of its laws." Hanson
v. Denckla (1957) 357 U.S. 235, 253. Thus, it is
only reasonable to conclude that Piguet must
"anticipate being haled into court" in New York
for alleged illegal conduct it performed through
these accounts. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v. Woodson (1980) 444 U.S. 286, 297 ("When a

1465 9-18-91

corporation 'purposefully avails itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the
forum State' it has clear notice that it is subject
to suit there"); see Gilbert, 82 F.R.D. at 725,
726 (noting that personal jurisdiction was
proper over Swiss bank whose only contact with
New York was through four accounts maintained with three New York broker-dealers,
since the cause of action sued upon arose out of
the purchases and sales of stock in New York
"which were not only the direct and foreseeable,
but the intended "effects" of the bank's "acts"
in Switzerland). Accordingly we find that in the
circumstances before us the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over Piguet comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Cf. Perez-Rubio, 718 F.Supp. at 227 ("On a
motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) . . .
all doubts are to be resolved in the plaintiff's
favor . . . a plaintiff need make out only a prima
facie case of personal jurisdiction").
Rule 12(b)(6)
In support of its motion to dismiss pursuant
to 12(b)(6) Piguet makes two contentions. First
it asserts that plaintiff has failed to plead fraud
with particularity as required by Rule 9. Second, it contends that plaintiff's actions were as
egregious as its own, and therefore that the
doctrine of pari delicto should bar plaintiff from
recovering as against it. We shall address each
of these contentions in turn.
BACKGROUND
The theory of the complaint is that defendant
Paul Kutik (hereinafter "Kutik") schemed to
inflate the value of Columbia Laboratories stock
(hereinafter "Columbia") in violation of Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and Rule 10b-5, promulgated thereunder. See 15
U.S.C. §78j; 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5. In particular, the complaint alleges that Kutik placed buy
orders for Columbia stock with various brokerage houses with no intention of actually paying
for the ordered shares. Plaintiff contends that
Kutik's motivation for this fraud stems from the
fact that he had secured substantial loans using
Columbia shares as collateral, and that, according to the terms of these loan agreements, he
would be obligated to put up additional collateral as security should the value of Columbia
stock decline to below $9.00 a share.
The gravamen of the claim against Piguet is
that Piguet aided and abetted Kutik's scheme to
manipulate the price of Columbia stock. The
relevant facts of this claim are as follows.
Plaintiff alleges that on or about August 3,
1990, it was contacted by Kutik to open an

(Footnote Continued)
jurisdiction over Piguet we need not presently address the
merits of this dispute.
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account on behalf of Dermar Panama, SA (hereinafter, the " D e r m a r " account) 2 . Kutik
informed plaintiff that he had authority to open
this account and to direct trading activities
therein on Dermar's behalf. In the following
week, acting under Kutik's instructions, plaintiff purchased an aggregate of 80,500 shares of
Columbia common stock for the Dermar
account. Although Kutik represented that payment for said purchases would be prompt, no
such payments were ever made. Compl. f 96.
On August 14, at Kutik's request, plaintiff
opened a second account, entitled the Farnell
Holdings, Ltd. account (hereinafter the "Farnell" account) 3 . Pursuant to Kutik's instructions, plaintiff purchased an aggregate of 88,300
shares of Columbia common stock for this
account over the next week.
After plaintiff made repeated demands for
payment for the Dermar purchases, Kutik
informed it that payment could be facilitated if
it would transfer the stock which it had purchased for the Dermar account to a new account
entitled the "Dermar Morgan" account and designate Morgan Guaranty as the receiving agent
for stock purchased for this new account. Kutik
explained that his bank, Piguet, had an account
at Morgan Guaranty, and that it would furnish
the funds necessary to pay for the stock on a
delivery versus payment basis. He assured
plaintiff that at all timts there would be sufficient funds on deposit with Morgan Guaranty to
pav for all transactions effected for this account.
See id. at 11 102.
Pursuant to this information, and at Kutik's
instruction, plaintiff contacted Piguet and was
informed that "both Kutik and Dermar were
clients of Piguet and that arrangements were
being made to make payment for the 80,500
shares of Columbia stock which [would be]
transferred to the Dermar Morgan account." 4
Id. at 1| 107. Accordingly, on August 21, 1990,
plaintiff opened the Dermar Morgan account.
Between August 21 and August 27, plaintiff
attempted to deliver to Morgan Guaranty the
80,500 shares of Columbia stock now purchased
on behalf of the Dermar Morgan account. Morgan Guarantv, however, refused such deliverv.
MatPlli;il2.
Again pursuant to Kutik's instructions, on
August 29, plaintiff opened a separate account
entitled the "Farnell Morgan" account, desig- Dermar, a defendant in this action, is a Panama corporation with its principal place of business in Switzerland.
•' Farnell. also a defendant, is a United Kingdom corporation with us principal place of business in Gibraltar.
4
Paragraph 107 of the complaint states that "[Piguet]
telephoned [plaintiff) prior to August 21. 1990, and eonfirmed that both Kutik arvd Dermar were clients of Piguet
and that arrangements were being made to make payment
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nated Morgan Guaranty the receiving agent for
this account, and transferred to it the stock
previously purchased for the Farnell account.
The complaint alleges that to confirm that payment arrangements were being made for this
transferred stock, plaintiff again contacted
Piguet, and was informed that Piguet would
make immediate payment for "all of the Columbia shares purchased for the various accounts
maintained by Kutik . . . upon delivery of such
securities to Morgan [ G u a r a n t v ] . " Id. at
H 126, 127.
At or about this time plaintiff, acting on
Kutik's instructions, purchased an additional
66,000 shares of Columbia stock for the Farnell
Morgan account and transferred all stock then
in the Dermar Morgan account to this Farnell
Morgan account. Accordingly, by September 1
plaintiff had purchased a total of 234,800 shares
of Columbia stock for Kutik, all of which were
held in the Farnell Morgan account.
On several occasions between August 29 and
September 7 plaintiff attempted to deliver the
234,800 shares to Morgan Guaranty. However,
Morgan Guaranty continued to refuse receipt of
this stock. Id. at jf 132.
The complaint alleges that thereafter Piguet
was advised that the 234,800 shares presently
held in the Farnell Morgan account would be
resold due to nonpayment. In response, on September 7 Piguet represented to plaintiff that:
[it] was in the process of making arrangements for the payment for all of the full
purchase price for all 234,000 [234,000]
[shares] of Columbia stock held in the Farnell
Morgan brokerage account, and that the previous delays preventing Morgan [Guaranty]
from accepting delivery of said securities and
tendering payment for same was due to
problems encountered in transmitting the
appropriate instructions to Morgan [Guaranty] for the conversion of Swiss Francs into
U.S. Dollars for payment to [plaintiff] for the
Columbia shares.
M a t 1J133.
On September 10, Piguet did in fact forward
to plaintiff $922,075.58 to pay for 100,000 of
the 234,800 Columbia shares. Plaintiff alleges
that in light of the September 7 conversation
with Piguet it justifiably relied upon the fact
that this was a partial payment and accordingly
for the 80.500 shares of Columbia slock, which had been
transferred to the Dermar Morgan Account, in cash, or by
delivery of other negotiable securities, to Morgan . . ." Since
the complaint informs that the Dermar Morgan account
was not opened until plaintiff had received this information
we presume the language cited above was intended to be set
forth in conditional terms.
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did not liquidate the remaining 134,800 shares.
Id. at H 191. Thereafter, on September 19, 20,
and 21, plaintiff's registered representative Jeffrey Leach introduced Kutik to other brokerdealers, with whom Kutik proceeded to place
purchase orders for an additional 56,000 snares
of Columbia stock. Piguet made no additional
payments to plaintiff, and in the period of September 20 to December 6 plaintiff sold the
remaining stock for $684,743. Plaintiff asserts
that it suffered a loss of $509,958 on this transaction.5
In support of its claim that Piguet aided and
abetted Kutik's alleged illegal conduct, the complaint specifically pleads "upon information and
belief" that Piguet knew of the existence and
purpose of Kutik's scheme to violate the securities laws, and that it rendered substantial assistance to this scheme. See id. at H K 188, 190. The
complaint asserts that Piguet's knowledge of the
underlying securities fraud perpetrated by
Kutik can be inferred from the fact that Piguet,
as Kutik's bank, "[knew] of Kutik's financial
resources and concomitant inability to make
payment" for the amount of shares he ordered.
See id. at fl 189. The complaint does not, however, specifically state that at the time Piguet
represented to plaintiff that it would pay for all
shares, see id. at f 133, it knew that it's client
would not be forwarding to it funds necessary to
pay for said shares; nor does it allege that when
Piguet asserted that it had had difficulty transferring Swiss francs into U.S. currency, see id., it
knew this statement to be false.
In its brief in opposition plaintiff offers an
additional fact from which Piguet's knowledge
of the alleged securities fraud might be inferred,
namely that it itself owned a substantial number of shares of Columbia stock in August 1990,
and that it engaged in substantial trading activity in this stock during the period of Kutik's
alleged fraudulent scheme. See PI. Mem. at 20
n.2; supra at 2, n.l. Plaintiff concedes, however,
that this information is not pleaded in its complaint.
DISCUSSION
Rule 9
To state a claim for aider and abettor liability
under Section 10(b) of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 a plaintiff must allege
sufficient facts to demonstrate: (1) the existence
of a securities law violation by the primary
party; (2) knowledge of the violation by the
5
$509 958 represents the difference between the price
plaintiff originally paid for the shares namely 2,116,777 and
the price it received from this delayed sale.
fl
For purposes of this motion, Piguet assumes that the
allegations in ihe Amended Complain* are sufficient to
allege securities laws violations by Kutik. See Def. Mem. at
14 n.7.
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aider and abettor; and (3) substantial assistance
by the aider and abettor in achievement of the
primary violation. Armstrong v. McAIpin (2d
Cir. 1983) 699 F.2d 79, 91. In support of this
motion to dismiss, Piguet contends that the allegations of the complaint are insufficient to properly plead factors (2) and (3).6
With respect to factor (3) Piguet contends
that as a matter of law its three conversations
with plaintiff do not constitute "substantial
assistance". Def. Mem at 20. We disagree. The
success of Kutik's alleged scheme artificially to
inflate the price of Columbia stock was dependent on his ability to induce plaintiff to
purchase shares on his behalf, over a period of
time. We can not say as a matter of law that no
reasonable juror could conclude that Piguet's
affirmative statement to plaintiff that it would
pay for all shares ordered by Kutik did not
substantially assist Kutik in this task. Accordingly, we turn to the question of whether or not
plaintiff has pleaded facts sufficient to establish
that Piguet knew that Kutik was engaged in a
scheme to violate the securities laws.
Citing Rule 9 7 , Piguet contends that even if
we were to assume that it knew that its client
Kutik did not have the funds at hand to pay for
the stock he was instructing plaintiff to
purchase, it by no means follows that it would
have known—or even should necessarily have
suspected—that Kutik was entering orders
which he did not hope to be able to cover.
Rather, it contends that it is only logical to infer
that it assumed Kutik would in due course provide the necessary funds for his purchases. In
support of this argument, Piguet draws our
attention to the absence of any allegation by
plaintiff that any statements it made to plaintiff were "knowinglv false" when made. See
5/30/91 Tr. at 24.
At first glance we found these arguments persuasive. However, at oral argument plaintiff
informed us that it did not affirmatively plead
that Piguet made false statements precisely
because the information necessary to plead such
an allegation is exclusively within Piguet's possession. In particular, plaintiff argued that
whether or not Piguet had in fact had difficulty
transferring Swiss francs to U.S. dollars, or had
made any efforts whatsoever prior to September
10 to pay for any of the stock ordered by Kutik,
were facts known only to Piguet and could be
substantiated only through discovery. See id. at
23-28.
Rule 9 provides:

In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances
constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, or other conditions of a
mind of a person may be averred generally.
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Although Rule 9 requires that allegations of
fraud be pleaded with particularity, it specifically provides that "[m]alice, intent, knowledge,
or other conditions of a mind of a person may be
averred generallv". In Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex
Hospital Trustees (1975) 425 U.S. 738, 746, the
Supreme Court observed that:
'[A] complaint should not be dismissed for
failure to state a claim unless it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no
set of facts in support of his claim which
would entitle him to relief.' Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) . . . And in . . .
cases, where 'the proof is largely in the hands
of the alleged conspirators,' Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting, 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962),
dismissals prior to giving the plaintiff ample
opportunity for discovery should be granted
very sparingly.
Having reviewed all of the allegations of the
complaint, as well as the briefs submitted in
relation to the instant motions, we can not say
that plaintiff can not prove any set of facts in
support of its claim that Piguet knew of Kutik's
scheme to violate the securities laws and,
accordingly, that it aided and abetted him in
this task. 'Cf. Ouaknine v. MacFarlane (2d Cir.
1990) 897 F.2d 75, 80-81 (" [p]lausible allegations that defendants made specific promises to
induce a securities transaction while secretly
intending not to carry them out or knowing they
could not be carried out, and that they were not
carried out, are sufficient . . . to state a claim for
relief under Section 10(b)' " (citations omitted)).
Accordingly, pursuant to the teaching of Hospital Bldg. Co., we presently deny Piguet's motion
to dismiss for failure to plead fraud with particularity, and grant plaintiff limited discovery on
the following two issues: (1) whether or not
statements which Piguet made to plaintiff during any of the three above discussed conversations were known by Piguet to be false at the
time they were made, and (2) whether—or to
what extent—Piguet's knowledge of Kutik's
fraudulent scheme can be inferred from its own
trading activities in the shares of Columbia
stock it owned. Piguet may, of course, renew this
motion to dismiss at the close of discovery on
these issues. Plaintiff, if so advised, may in the
interim file a second amended complaint.
In pari delicto
As an alternative ground for dismissing the
complaint, Piguet asserts that even if the plaintiff could allege a valid aiding and abetting
claim, the doctrine of in pari delicto should
preclude it from recovering on this claim
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because it was plaintiff's own imprudence and
negligence which caused it to suffer the financial loss here asserted. See 5/30/91 Tr. at 28. In
support of this claim, Piguet cites the facts that
plaintiff, a sophisticated broker-dealer, proceeded to permit Kutik to order an aggregate of
234,800 shares of Columbia stock over a period
of less than six weeks without ever having paid
one cent for said purchases, and it even "aided"
Kutik in his purchase of an additional 56,000
Columbia shares by introducing him to other
broker-dealers even though it, itself, had never
been paid for any of the stock Kutik ordered
purchased.
The common law defense of in pari delicto
prohibits a plaintiff from recovering only if he
"is as guiltv of wrongdoing as the party he
accuses." Ross v. Bolton, (S.D.N.Y. 1986) 639
F.Supp. 323, 328 citing Mallis v. Bankers Trust,
(2d Cir. 1980) 615 F.2d 68, 76 cert, denied,
(1981) 449 U.S. 1123, 101 S. Ct. 938, 67
L.Ed.2d 109. Mere stupidity, or even recklessness, will not suffice to trigger this bar. As the
Court in Pinter v. Dahl (1988) 486 U.S. 622,
636 stated:
The plaintiff must be an active, voluntary
participant in the unlawful activity that is
the subject of the suit. 'Plaintiffs who are
truly in pari delicto aire those who have themselves violated the law in cooperation with the
defendant'. Unless the degrees of fault are
essentially indistinguishable or the plaintiff's
responsibility is clearly greater, the in pari
delicto defense should not be allowed, and the
plaintiff should be compensated, (citations
omitted).
On the facts presently before us, we can not
conclude that this affirmative defense will inevitably bar plaintiff from recovering against
Piguet. Piguet does not claim that plaintiff
knew of Kutik's fraudulent scheme nor does it
assert that plaintiff's actions to accommodate
Kutik's requests to purchase stock were in any
way unlawful. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss on this ground is denied.
CONCLUSION
Piguet's motions to dismiss are denied. It is
granted leave to renew that portion of its Rule
12(b)(6) motion specified above after discovery
on the issues outlined is completed or after a
reasonable period of time has passed. Plaintiff is
granted leave to file a second amended complaint, if it be so advised.
SO ORDERED.
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